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CROSS-CULTURAL READINGS OF INTENT: FORM,
FICTION, AND REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
Deborah Waire Post

In her article, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context,
Professor Nancy Kim tackles the problems created by an objective
theory of contract in a pluralistic society and a global economy. She
is a proponent of an “expanded intent analysis,” which she says
would require courts to consider facts “in cultural context.”1 Her
test for contractual intent, which she has named “contextual
purposive intent,” would include the social identities of the parties
to the contract.2 I have chosen to focus on her analysis of Kim v.
Son,3 an unpublished California appellate court decision in which
the plaintiff’s claim was denied for lack of consideration, and her
argument that a contextual purposive intent analysis would have
changed the outcome and produced a more just result in that case.
I. THEORIZING CULTURE IN CONTRACT
Professor Kim places contract theory in a sociocultural context.
An examination of culture and law is multifaceted, operating on
various levels and in multiple sites. There is the cultural context
that is present in a particular dispute, the ideological and cultural
content of contract theory, as well as the culture and institutional
norms that are internalized by the judiciary.
While there is an emerging consensus that cultural competence
is a skill and ethical obligation of practitioners, it is much harder to
find articles promoting a judicial ethic of cultural competence.4 The

 Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Touro Law Center, co-author with
Amy Kastley and Nancy Ota of Contracting Law, a contracts casebook.
1. Nancy S. Kim, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 659 (2010).
2. Id. at 643–44.
3. No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2009).
4. See, e.g., Sylvia E. Stevens, Cultural Competency: Is There an Ethical
Duty?, 69 OR. ST. B. BULL., Jan. 2009, at 9, 9–10 (discussing three justifications
for cultural competency including competitive advantage, access to justice, and
access to legal services). Using the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct,
Stevens finds this ethical obligation in the duty to provide competent
representation, the duty to pursue the client’s objectives, and the duty to
communicate. Id. See also Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building CrossCultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001) (explaining that
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ethical identity of judges is deeply rooted in a value system and
ideology that creates social distance between the members of the
bench and those who appear before them. For judges, objectivity
and neutrality are core values associated with the ideals of fairness
and justice.
Critical scholars have condemned “colorblind”
jurisprudence as “pluralistic ignorance” that masquerades as
neutrality and perpetuates structures of subordination and
oppression.5 There is not much evidence that the judiciary has
taken this criticism to heart except, perhaps, in a very limited and
sometimes misguided way in criminal cases.6
The relevance of culture to contract has been explored by
relational scholars,7 but that does not mean that there is a general
recognition among judges or practitioners of the way their
perceptions and judgments about contract are rooted in a particular
belief system or worldview. An objective test for reasonableness in
contract may be presumed to be hegemonic—the imposition of a
meaning derived from the cultural lexicon of the dominant group in

cultural competence is considered a skill that can and must be taught to law
students as well as part of the ethical and professional identity of lawyers);
Katherine Frink-Hamlett, The Case for Cultural Competency, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 25,
2011, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202491042907
&slreturn=1 (arguing that cultural competency can have a significant impact on
legal services and should thus be incorporated into law school curricula); Amy
Timmer & John Berry, The ABA’s Excellent and Inevitable Journey to
Incorporating Professionalism in Law School Accreditation Standards, 20 PROF.
LAW., no. 1, 2010, at 1, 17–19 (proposing that law schools can and should foster
an environment which teaches cultural competency).
5. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Colorblind,”
44 STAN. L REV. 1, 2–3 (1991); Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto,
Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in
Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 1980–81 (1993).
6. Pluralistic ignorance has been used in two ways in legal scholarship. I
am referring to the use made by critical race scholars who describe pluralistic
ignorance as the “erroneous cognitive beliefs shared by one group regarding
other individuals or groups.” Greene, supra note 5, at 1981 n.4. More precisely,
it is ignorance of the particular facts, the lived experience of subordinated
communities, which can or should be used to judge the reasonableness of the
interpretations, choices, and judgments made by members of that community.
See id. Pluralistic ignorance is used by law and economics scholars in
discussions of norms and their influence on human behavior. “Under conditions
of pluralistic ignorance, normative influence leads to the entrenchment of
suboptimal, as opposed to welfare-enhancing behaviors.” Alex Geisinger, Are
Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as
Private Regulation, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005).
7. For a discussion of the work of Macneil and Macaulay, see generally
Menachem Mautner, Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What is So Problematic
in the Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?, 3 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN L. 545, 547 (2002) (“[C]ulture was brought to the center stage of the
contract process by Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil.”).
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society. Unless the judge is that “wise Latina,”8 or one whose
cultural identity has predisposed him to cultural sensitivity, it is
unlikely that a judge will measure the reasonable expectations of
the parties to a contract by any other standard. The acculturative
effects of participation in legal institutions like law school, law
firms, bar associations, and the judiciary suggest that identity is not
always a reliable indicator of cross-cultural or multicultural
competence.9 In contract disputes, the commitment to objectivity on
the part of the judiciary may be even more deeply ingrained. This
commitment is tied to market ideology, a belief that individual
agency in bargaining and market exchange is preserved by judicial
restraint and the use of formal rules.
Contract law has been theorized as an internally inconsistent
body of law because it embraces rules that vindicate both an
individualist and a collectivist ethos.10 Enforcement of subjective
expectations and desires seems more consistent with a commitment
to individual liberty, while a reasonableness or collectivist standard
is believed to limit individual freedom.
This dichotomy in contract law theory between an individualist
and a collectivist approach is, of course, inherently misleading.
Contract law is about relationships and whenever a contractual
relationship ends in a dispute, resolution by a court of law limits the
freedom of one or both parties. Contract has been theorized as a
liberty because the role of the state is made to seem attenuated,
enforcing only the duties created by the parties under circumstances

8. Professor Kim refers to the skirmish over the article Justice Sotomayor
wrote in which she referred to the importance of her identity and her
expectation and hope that this would make her a “wise Latina” judge. Justice
Sotomayor brings a different perspective to the Court not only because her life
history is different, but also because of her identity as a Latina and her
exposure to beliefs, ideals, and values rooted in the experiences of a community,
not just her experiences as an individual. While news media faithfully reported
the public relations releases that portrayed Justice Sotomayor as a woman
whose success was an “American story,” Republican legislators suggested that
her gender and her ethnicity meant that she would be “biased.” Kim, supra
note 1, at 650–51.
9. There have been some attempts to determine whether identity affects
the decisions of judges. The common assumption is that it does, or at least that
is the argument of those who argue for diversity on the bench and in the bar.
See generally Greene, supra note 5. One should be careful about using identity
as a predictor. For instance, Professor Kim criticizes the decision of Judge
Marsha Ternus in In re Marriage of Witten because the two biological parents
were treated the same even though the woman’s investment or contribution to
the creation of the preembryos and her inability to procreate if she remarried
meant that she and her ex-husband were in very different positions. Kim,
supra note 1, at 660–68.
10. Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV.
829, 830, 838–39 (1983).
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which signal assent to legal enforcement.11 The rules of contract
law are not concerned with the vindication of one individual’s desire
or freedom, but address the freedom of all the parties to the
agreement. If more than one person is involved, some means must
be devised to determine the meaning both parties assigned to
various communicative acts.
The element of intersubjectivity
removes the agreement beyond the realm of the individual.12
Professor Kim seeks to replace the objective theory of contract,
as it is presently understood, with one that considers the social and
cultural identity of the disputants. She argues that an objective test
“erroneously replaces the parties’ intent with a reasonableness
standard.”13 I agree with Professor Kim that a reasonable person
test is coercive when the perceptions and the expectations of the
parties to a contract are analyzed in the abstract. The reasonable
person test should be an acknowledgement of community—the
human connections that support and constrain individual choice and
agency. For that reason, Contracting Law, the casebook I coauthored with Amy Kastely and Nancy Ota, presents the
“reasonable person” standard methodologically as a continuum that
ranges from the most abstract conception of reasonableness to one
which is local and particular, a “situated reasonableness” test.14 A
contextual purposive intent test or a situated reasonableness test is
not abandonment, but redefinition, of the reasonable person test. A
reasonable person test may even have liberatory potential when
“community” is defined appropriately.
Hegemony in contract law is most often expressed in universal
principles that are justified in terms of powerful sentiments like
freedom and liberty. The legal realists and critical scholars,
however, have argued that freedom is not enhanced and liberty
interests are not protected when the legitimate expectations are
defeated.15 Those who argue for a situated reasonableness approach

11. “[T]he law views private individuals as possessing a power to effect,
within certain limits, changes in their legal relations. . . . When a court enforces
a promise it is merely arming with legal sanction a rule or lex previously
established by the party himself.” Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806 (1941).
12. Intersubjectivity is defined as “involving or occurring between separate
conscious minds.”
Merriam Webster, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 613 (10th ed. 1996).
13. Kim, supra note 1, at 644.
14. See generally AMY KASTELY, DEBORAH POST & NANCY OTA, CONTRACTING
LAW (4th ed. 2006).
15. One phrasing of that argument:
That portion of the field of law that is classified and described as the
law of contracts attempts the realization of reasonable expectations
that
have
been
induced
by
the
making
of
a
promise. . . . Reasonableness is no more absolute in character than is
justice or morality. Like them it is an expression of the customs and
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to intent, or a contextual purposive test for intent, as Professor Kim
has expressed it, are advocating for an approach that recognizes the
relationship between the individual and the collective. Professor
Kim is asking whether the measure of reasonableness in Kim v. Son
involved facts that were not in evidence because the Korean identity
of the two parties was ignored. The objective test in this case should
reference the beliefs and expectations of members of the Korean or
Korean American community.
II. CULTURAL COMPETENCE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Advocates for “cultural competence” or for the eradication of
“pluralistic ignorance” in the administration of justice in the United
States will find in Kim v. Son a deafening silence. There was no
meaningful discussion of the shared identity of the disputants as
Koreans. The identity of the parties was revealed in the facts of the
case, but was not acknowledged in the application of the law or in
the discussion of the doctrines or rules of law that determine the
outcome.
In the context of Kim v. Son, we might ask who bears the
responsibility for addressing the issues of pluralistic ignorance. The
responsibility ought to be shared by legal counsel and the judiciary.
At a minimum, judges need to examine critically any evidence
presented of cultural practices and the relevance or generalizations
that can be drawn from that evidence. The greater burden,
however, lies with the attorney representing a client whose
expectations are likely to be dismissed as unreasonable and
illegitimate because they are shaped or framed by a different
culture. Since culture is often invisible—consisting of beliefs that
are perceived to be self-evident and incontestable—only the
introduction of testimony or evidence about a competing worldview
will serve to make culture visible as a “truth” that can be contested.
I see no reference in the appellate brief submitted by Kim’s
lawyer to any cultural information that might support his client’s
claim.16 If cultural evidence had been introduced, the burden ought
to have shifted to the judges to consider the reliability and the
relevance of this information.
Cross-cultural or comparative
A
analysis may seem straightforward, but it seldom is.17

mores—the customs and mores that are themselves complex, variable
with time and place, inconsistent and contradictory.
1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 2, 4 (rev. ed. 1993).
16. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, Kim v. Son, 2008 WL 39993686 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (No. G039818).
17. An abject lesson in the use of anthropologists as experts would be the
testimony by Burton Pasternak, a cultural anthropologist, in People v. Dong Lu
Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988). See Cynthia Lee, Cultural
Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ.
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sociocultural analysis at trial or on appeal would be easier if people
understood what culture is, but even scholars use the term
promiscuously, so that the concept has a fuzziness about it that
makes it an awkward analytical tool. Culture is best described as a
“worldview,” a sense of the way things are and the way they should
be, the way people should behave, and the social significance of the
relationships between them. Everything else is elaboration—the
symbols we use, the myths we perpetuate, and the material culture
we produce.
The issues raised in the representation of members of culturally
diverse communities are complex. As one anthropologist explained
it, when evidence of culture is introduced, there is a risk that this
evidence will create or reinforce an “essentialist understanding of
cultural communities as clearly bounded and internally
homogeneous.”18 While anthropologists claim to “treat ambiguity
and complexity as immanent aspects of all real life situations,” the
methodology employed by most courts is “to prune away ‘extraneous’
details.”19 The risk inherent in this methodology is an essentialist
representation, the “othering” of a cultural community and the
particular litigant.20
The relevance of culture is easy to see in a case where two
Korean men bring their dispute into a U.S. court and the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff is a contract signed in blood. We are
surprised by the practice, if practice it is, of recording a promise in
blood, but not because blood oaths are unknown to us. There is a
practice that is commonplace in American culture, a way people
create fictive fraternal relationships with ritual behavior that
involves a mixing of blood.21
But these expressions of loyalty take place in private
ceremonies that have nothing to do with commercial transactions.22
And while much is made of the practice in Asia of business
L. REV. 911, 941–42 (2007); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women
and the “Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 65 (1994).
18. Anthony Good, Cultural Evidence in Courts of Law, 14 J. ROYAL
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. S47, S52 (Supp. 2008).
19. Id. at S51.
20. The best example of the misuse of culture in lawyering and the
“othering” of an immigrant is the much criticized case of People v. Dong Lu
Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988). See Lee, supra note 17; Volpp,
supra note 17; Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology
to Develop Cultural Self-Awareness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 388 (2005)
(concluding that the testimony of the anthropologist offering evidence of
Chinese culture “began and ended on the premise of an essentialized Chinese
man, rooted in a culture completely foreign from American culture”).
21. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, “Blood Oath” Sealed Stanford Deal, Court is
Told, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2009, at B1.
22. One exception might be the “blood brother” relationship that is alleged
to exist between R. Allen Stanford, who was being prosecuted for his operation
of a fraudulent Ponzi scheme, and his banker in Antigua, Leroy King. Id.
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transactions that are preceded by or negotiated in social settings
that involve consumption of alcohol, such practices are not unknown
in the United States either. Whether it is the “three martini lunch,”
the golf game followed by cocktails at the country club, or the
baseball game at which huge quantities of beer are consumed, the
use of alcohol to lubricate the wheels of commerce is not unknown in
American culture. After all, generations of law students have cut
their conceptual teeth on a case involving two men who were “high
as a Georgia Pine” when they wrote out a contract on a paper
napkin and a court had no problem finding contractual intent in
that case.23
The difficulty in attempts to find cross-cultural similarities is
the risk inherent in cultural translation, the temptation to find
something analogous in both cultures and treat them as equivalents.
Inappropriate cultural translation is not the problem in Kim v. Son.
There are inferences drawn by the court that disregard Korean
cultural practices Professor Kim documents in her article,
specifically the conclusion that Son was “extremely intoxicated”
when he promised to repay the money to Kim.24 On the other hand,
the criticism implicit in the court’s legal conclusion—a meritless suit
against a “friend” is not consideration—may represent some sort of
cultural convergence. In this case, the American tradition of
condemning litigious behavior might produce the same result as a
presumed preference for alternative dispute resolution in some
Asian countries.25
Professor Kim is cognizant of the risk of essentialism and
othering effect of the blood contract; she is worried that its “freakish,
exotic quality” might have distracted the judges in the case from an
examination of the aspects of Korean culture more relevant to the
dispute.26 She is careful to point out the deliberation with which the
parties created two versions, the one written in pen and ink and the
other written in blood, but she also includes some discussion of
scholarship that characterizes Korean culture as one in which honor
and shame matter.27
She does not speculate about Korean culture or engage in
inappropriate “translations.” Instead she provides insight into
Korean culture using documentary sources. Professor Kim cites to a
U.S. Department of Commerce publication, Korean and U.S. news
articles, American scholarly materials about Asian and U.S.
conceptions of contract, including the absence of doctrines like

23.
24.
2009).
25.
17.
26.
27.

Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 519, 522 (Va. 1954).
Kim v. Son, No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9,
See generally the discussion of cultural convergence in Lee, supra note
Kim, supra note 1, at 658–59.
Id.
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consideration or rules like the statute of frauds.28 The issue most
germane to the question of volitional intent in Kim v. Son would be
the article claiming that Koreans do not recognize consideration as a
requirement for the formation of a contract.
III. THE MISSING LINK: CULTURE, CONSIDERATION, AND THE
CORPORATE PERSON
The outcome in Kim v. Son is not simply a function of pluralistic
ignorance or lack of cultural competence. That deficiency might
have been cured by a test for intent that considered the social
identity of the parties and the cultural context in which the
transaction took place. The problem in Kim v. Son cannot be
addressed by an intent test because, to use Lon Fuller’s dichotomy,
the issue is not consideration as “form” but consideration as
“substance.”29 The doctrine of consideration is sometimes explained
or justified in terms of its function, which is why Professor Kim
discusses the cautionary, channeling, and evidentiary effects of the
writing in this case.30 But a situated reasonableness test or a
volitional intent test in the United States cannot save a transaction
memorialized in writing by the parties even if the writing serves the
evidentiary and cautionary functions. Kim v. Son is a case in which
the court gives notice to the parties that form must be satisfied;
consideration doctrine performs a categorical function, sorting legal
from nonlegal transactions.31
Courts have not adopted a standard that looks exclusively at
the actual intent of the parties. With the exception of the UCC
where consideration is no longer required for options or
modifications,32 the efforts to remedy the injustices that arise from
the strict application of the consideration doctrine have led to the
creation of very specific exceptions. Promissory estoppel and
promise for a past benefit are offered as alternatives to
consideration. The naming and categorization of these exceptions
may actually have impeded a more fluid approach, one which relies
on a less structured examination of reasonable expectations. The
quotation from Fuller Professor Kim cites is promising, but I can
think of no “forces native to the situation,” especially the “habits and
conceptions of the transacting parties” that currently render
“superfluous” formality in the guise of the consideration doctrine.33
The exceptions that have been created, promise for a past
benefit and promissory estoppel, are inapplicable in Kim v. Son

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 654–58.
Fuller, supra note 11, at 799–800.
Kim, supra note 1, at 648–49.
Fuller, supra note 11, at 803.
See U.C.C. §§ 2-205, 2-209 (2010).
Fuller, supra note 11, at 805.
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because of a juridical fidelity to the legal fiction that a corporation is
a person. In the eyes of the California courts, Son did not receive a
benefit before or after he made the promise because Kim loaned
money to and invested money in corporate entities. The court uses a
straight doctrinal approach, applying the consideration doctrine to
make the promises unenforceable.
The real impediment to
enforcement in this case is the existence of two corporations, one in
Korea and one in the United States. No one, not the court or the
lawyers, had much to say about the operation of these entities
except to conclude that they were “valid corporations,” that the loans
and investments went to the corporations and that there was “no
evidence that . . . Son received any of the money.”34
Both of the exceptions to the consideration doctrine are thus
made inapposite. A promise for a past benefit is a doctrine that
every law student learns in law school. In California, it is statutory
as well as a matter of common law.35 Mills v. Wyman, the canonical
case instructing law students on the difference between moral
obligation and legal obligation, acknowledged that a subsequent
promise to perform a contract that had become unenforceable
because of some “legal impediment” could be enforced by the
promisee.36 Kim never had a contract with Son; nor did he confer a
benefit on Son—unless, of course, investing at his behest in one
corporation and loaning money to the other is considered a benefit.
The court did not think so. Like Wyman, the dishonorable father in
Mills v. Wyman who had no legal obligation to pay for a benefit his
son received after he came of age even though the father promised to
do so, Son had no obligation to pay for a benefit received by his
wholly owned corporation.
The only way Son could be responsible for the money he asked
Kim to invest or loan to his companies and that he promised to
repay would be if he personally guaranteed these debts. Case law in
California precludes this as a possibility. A third party cannot
guarantee repayment for a loan already advanced unless there is
separate consideration for that guarantee.37 If Kim had threatened
to sue the corporations, Son’s promise to pay the debt might have

34. Kim v. Son, No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232, *2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9,
2009).
35. Cal. Civ. Code § 1606 (West 2008) (“An existing legal obligation resting
upon the promisor, or a moral obligation originating in some benefit conferred
upon the promisor, or prejudice suffered by the promisee, is also a good
consideration for a promise, to an extent corresponding with the extent of the
obligation, but no further or otherwise.”).
36. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 209 (1825).
37. Cal. Civ. Code § 2792 (West 2008) (“Where a suretyship obligation is
entered into at the same time with the original obligation, or with the
acceptance of the latter by the creditor, and forms with that obligation a part of
the consideration to him, no other consideration need exist. In all other cases
there must be a consideration distinct from that of the original obligation.”).
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been supported by consideration. But the attorney did not allege a
threat to sue the corporations.
The pleadings alleged Kim’s
forbearance in suing Son. The court concluded that forbearance to
sue on a meritless claim was not consideration.
In the United States, a written promise may serve an
evidentiary function, but it is not sufficient to establish liability
without a bargain—a past benefit or reliance. The use of ritual,
resorting to symbols intended to signal intent to be legally bound,
are ineffective. A ritual act, even if it is used frequently in another
culture, is unlikely to subvert the fidelity of U.S. courts to
established contract doctrines or to the fictive corporate person.
Still, if I were making an argument about reasonable expectations,
the aspect of Korean culture that I might explore would be the
relative permeability of the corporate form. The doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil exists in Korea just as it does in the United
States.38 What I would like to know is not whether Korea has a
shaming culture, but whether Korean businessmen and the legal
system in Korea expect that they, as the owners of closely held
corporations, can create for themselves a binding obligation to pay
the debt of the corporation.

38. See generally Young-Cheol David K. Jeong, Comments on Piercing
Corporate Veil Cases at Korean Courts (Korean) (June 1, 2009) (Working
Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1662862 (stating that Korean
courts have accepted the theory of piercing the corporate veil).

